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VICTIMS' RIGHT TO TRUTH
Donald W. Shriver, Jr.
Union Theological Seminary, New York

"We can now deal with our past, establish the truth which has so long been denied us and lay the
basis for genuine reconciliation. Only the truth can put the past to rest."
--Nelson Mandela
"[T]he struggle of man against power is the struggle of memory against forgetting."
--Milan Kundera
"The facts do not only speak, they call our in the midst of and intolerable silence, that is being
imposed on the immediate past. Silence has become a cornerstone--placed in the past by the
dictatorship and in the present by those who believe that it can assure a peaceful future. But the
facts, the victims, are there; they speak or call out to us. There is no future in pretending to be
deaf to what they are saying."
________

In February 1995 this author was privileged to listen to a dialogue of West and East Berlin
Christians, met in one of a series of such gatherings for giving voice to complaints against each
other from both sides of the former Berlin Wall. The purpose of the gathering was to strengthen
the bonds of the two parts of the new Synod of Berlin-Brandenburg, formally constituted in the
spring of 1991 in the wake of the 1990 reunification of Germany. The crux of the conversation,
often bitter and angry, was the protest of parishioners from the former German Democatic
Republic against the leaders of their own Evangelical Church for various degrees of cooperation
with the notorious Stasi. We now know that its agents compiled some 120 miles of file records
on the goings and comings of seventeen million east Germans--an average of some 26 feet of file
drawer per citizen. Uppermost in the discussion was accusation and defense of pastors who had
acted as Stasi informers on members of their congregations. Some pastors replied that the price
of shielding parishioners was sometimes just such cooperation, spiced with protective lies. Since
the Stasi themselves often "enriched" their written reports on citizens with elaborations designed
to enhance career reputations, the resulting picture is one of layered oversupply of official and
unofficial lies, a corruption of all that might be implied in the term "civil society." It is also a
picture of truths that belonged to the private spheres of a society in any sense democratic. Indeed,
dictatorial regimes in the twentieth century have practiced arts of control that turned upside down
the democratic distinction between public and private, prying into every aspect of family and
personal lives while protecting government's right to keep its own activity secret.
What is the place of truth-speaking in the texture of civil society? How much truth about
personal lives belongs only to individuals and non-governmental spheres? How much belongs
rightly to the public sphere? Who, and what institutions, are required for protecting private truths

and exposing truths that deserve publicity? To these general questions there are no easy answers,
but the distinction between democratic and dictatorial polities depends crucially on distinctions
between rightly private and rightly public truth-telling. For the restoration of that distinction,
public exposure of its violation may be the only practical recourse.
We live in a time of world history when, in numerous countries, citizens are demanding of their
government the public exposure of a category of truth that autocratic regimes characteristically
prefer to keep "off the record": torture, imprisonment, and death meted out to thousands of
political dissidents on a scale that justly deserves the new name, "administrative massacre."
Within the past fifteen years, dozens of countries have seen some version of this demand. The
list is long: Argentina, Chile, El Salvador, Nicaragua, Guatemala, South Africa, Rwanda, Bosnia,
Taiwan, Australia, the United States. Common to all these cases is the claim of certain citizens
that they have been victims of extreme, unjust suffering at the hands of official governmental
power and that--whatever other forms of justice they may now deserve--they deserve to have the
truth about their suffering made public.
Such victims' "right to truth" has received little formal attention in discussions of human
rights generally in the past fifty years. The Universal Declaration of Human Rights (1948)
speaks of the right of everyone to "a fair and public hearing" of any criminal charge against
them, to "recognition everywhere as a person before the law" and to "effective remedy by the
competent national tribunals for acts violating...fundamental rights granted...by the constitution
or by law." The effective enjoyment of these rights presumes a judicial system willing to
implement them. Such systems are notoriously lacking in the legal orders of autocracies, whose
proponents are only too willing to invoke the undercutting clause in Article 4 of the International
Covenant on Civil and Political Rights (1966) which allows for government suspension of
certain rights "in time of public emergency which threatens the life of the nation."
The latter Covenant comes closer to the circumstances of a society in recovery from centralized
government repression when it calls, in Article Two, 3a, for "an effective remedy" for violations
of rights "notwithstanding that the violation has been committed by persons acting in an official
capacity." The following Article 2, 3.b. calls for the effecting of this right by "competent judicial,
administrative, or legislative authorities". But the realism of the article, vis a vis repressive
government, glimmers in its final assertion of the right of aggrieved individuals, in the absence
of such competent authorities, "to develop the possibilities of judicial remedy."
Citizens of countries with long, institutionalized protections of free assembly, free
speech, and freedom of religion are likely to overlook and underestimate the human importance
of this raw, basic beginning of "justice" in societies where such freedoms are absent. "Mothers of
the Disappeared" in Argentina, demonstrating daily in the Buenos Aires square in the 1980s,
were facing, at risk, the alleged right of government to make the disappeared to remain
disappeared from all public knowledge. It is the characteristic final injustice that an unjust
government means to inflict upon its victims: As Adolf Hitler said about his plan to obliterate the
Jews, after it was over, nobody would even remember them. "Who, after all, speaks today of the
annihilation of the Armenians?"
In fact, most surviving Armenians are determined that neither they nor the world will
forget that annihilation: some l.5 million kinspeople whom the Turkish government considered
its enemies in 19l5. As Peter Balakian, grandson of the generation that endured this massacre,

recently commented:
The Armenian holocaust deserves to take its rightful moral place in history. For a
generation for whom there could be no justice, the pain is compounded by the evil
of denial. There is always a period of delay after a trauma. But now we are at a
moment of threshold.
For Balakian and others like him, no "moment" is too late for paying attention to the atrocious
suffering of ancestors unnoticed by the public. For the sufferers themselves, some moments may
be too soon, so unwelcome psychologically may be the rehearsal of their pain and loss.
Surviving victims of torture, in particular, may conceal all mention of their ordeal, not only
because the memory is so painful but because close friends and relatives may resist hearing of it.
Eric Dyson, a Scot who survived torture in a Japanese prison camp in World War Two,
discovered that neither his wife nor his friends had sustained interest in his sufferings. For thirtyfive years he kept the story to himself, spilling it out only in the early 1980s to a psychiatrist
who, as a young doctor assigned to interviews with survivors of Auschwitz, had developed as her
specialty therapy for torture victims.
The moral and psychological cases for affording publicity to victims of unjust suffering
are not the same, however, as the political and legal cases. Central to post-oppressive legislative,
legal, and public debate over the establishment of "truth commissions," for example, is the moral
concern that public culture, law, and institutions be recast into new democratic molds that inhibit
the repetition of the oppression. A prime illustration in recent American history is the reparation
tendered to survivors of the internment of Japanese-Americans during World War Two. The
internment was unjust from many points of view, beginning with its doubtful military necessity
and its questionable legality in American law. By their persistence in lobbying the government
for redress, survivors of the camps and their children finally persuaded the United States
government to revoke the presidential order that put 120,000 Japanese Americans behind barbed
wire, to set up a commission to investigate the history, and to tender to survivors an official
Congressional apology accompanied by a modest financial reparation of $20,000 for each
survivor. The event was a paradigm for what victims of massive governmentally-enacted
injustice can contribute to the reform of public culture and its institutions: Not only do the
victims receive some belated satisfaction of their own sense of justice, but their stories enter the
public media and other shapers of public cultural consciousness. Yet more important, the stories
become warnings to political leaders: "Never again." Moral, psychological, legal, political, and
cultural realities all appear in these proocedures; each has a part in the recasting of a public's
memory and acknowledgement of its own past. But the role of governmental acknowledgment is
crucial: "What the victims want is an authoritative narrative, an 'official story,' as the remedy for
the wrongs they have endured."
In the current, virtually unprecedented clamor for public acknowledgment of these past
evils, there are many questions to be raised concerning reasons for the clamor, the proper public
institutional forms for responding to it, the benefits of such truth-telling for the development of
pluralistic democratic society, and the avoidance of harms to that development. In the rest of this
essay, I want to explore some of these questions.
Why, in the 1990s, the clamor for victims' right to public truth?

Hitler used to say that he would compel his enemies to use weapons like his own, only he
would use them more skillfully than would they. Secrecy is one such weapon in the arsenals of
dictatorships, and the years l914-90 saw its use on a massive scale in hot and cold wars and
revolutions. Rightist dictatorships arising against the threat of Communist dictatorships--much
twentieth century world political history could be subsumed under that theme. Even in wellestablished democracies like the United States, threats to national existence can tempt political
authority to become authoritarian, as the Japanese-American case again illustrates. The U.S.
Central Intelligence Agency, child of the exigencies of World War Two, acquired permanent
place in the American government once a worldwide conflict with Soviet-sponsored
Communism had begun. Quite important for democratic defenders of the C.I.A., however, is the
law that requires the Agency to practice the arts of spying and espionage upon citizens and
systems external to the United States. Presumably the democratic uses of violence-in-secret must
be severely limited. Especially in its near-monopoly of the tools of violence, democratic
governmental use of those tools must be open to public scrutiny. As in every war, official,
organized violence is maximally vulnerable to the commission of atrocity. Democrats know of
no stronger protection against such atrocity than some institutionalized likelihood that it will be
subject--finally if not in the act--to public scrutiny.
Across continents in the 1990s, calls for public accountability for the crimes of
government against its citizens
have been simultaneous with the turn towards liberal democratic systems in the wake of the
collapse of the Soviet Union and the end of the Cold War. Especially in Eastern Europe and
South Africa, the revival (or first birth) of citizen freedom to criticize government coincided with
the weakening of Soviet power. And in country after country a remarkable first use of the new
freedom has been the outcry: "Let the government tell us the truth of what its predecessors did to
our fellow citizens, our relatives, ourselves!"
If a world political context helps explain this phenomenon, the political price of secrecy,
inside these countries, is a second explanation. Over the years, whether in the Soviet Union or in
fascist Argentina, the alleged right of government to keep its actions secret precipitated massive
citizen distrust of official government "truth." Pravda ("Truth") went out of business in the 1990s
once it was no longer compulsory reading for either bureaucrats or ordinary citizens. Long
before, of course, few of the latter trusted Pravda as a purveyor of truth. This virus of mistrust is
a great danger to the functioning of government. Mistrustful of almost everything the
government says, most citizens will eventually cease to trust officials to look out for anything but
their own power and interests. Indeed, since not even the most efficient totalitarian system can
conceal all evidence of the truth about its actions, citizens will progessively limit their trust to
private sources of information. Nikita Krushchev's l956 revelations of the atrocities of Stalin
must have had a confidence-restoring effect in the relation of citizens to his government,
however partial the revelations may have been. Not the least humanly important result of his
revelations was the rehabilitation of certain public reputations--a small entry of victims' right to
truth under a government that still claimed a right to manufacture good and bad reputations at
will. Do the dead have rights? Moral rememberers think so.
The truth about political truth-telling here is at once moral and practical: a cetain
minimum of match between what a government does and it what it publicizes is necessary for a
certain minimum of citizen loyalty. Doubtless, in the days of its decline, the Moscow

government would have liked to have covered up the failures of both Chernobyl and the
Chechnyan war. By the time of each of these disasters, the Soviet public had too much access to
at least some of the facts for such a coverup to have been successful. Most Americans, in the
Watergate crisis, knew that officials do not always tell the truth to their publics, but by
democratic instinct we knew that systematic public lying was a threat to the republic.
In the 1990s, the proliferation of truth commissions, declarations of amnesty, and sundry
victim demands for reparations expresses a public outflow of grievances long dammed up behind
walls of government refusal to tolerate public voicing of its crimes. That there is such a thing as
crimes of power, of course, is fundamental to the experience of those who construct governments
of limited power. No truly totalitarian system can tolerate such a principle. To do so would be to
give up the notion of its right to define the truth that its public should be taught to believe in.
Religion, art, and science have a large stake in resisting that notion. So also does every theory of
human rights.
Doubtless historians will find a widespreading complex of other reasons why the 1990s
have seen a plethora of these calls for redress of the crimes of government against its citizens.
They will also survey the varieties of governmental response to these calls. Below is one such
survey.
What are the measures that governments have so far enacted to effect victims' right to public
truth?
A simple list of the measures turns out to be not so simple. Deep, controversial questions about
personal-social-political recovery from traumatic pasts arise when the goal of one measure--e.g
satisfying a victim's sense of justice--conflicts with the goal of another--e.g. inducing
perpetrators to come forward with the truth of what they did. Delaying attention here to these
difficulties, here is the range of measures that governments and citizens have devised during the
past fifteen years:
l. Public judicial prosecution. Preceding the postwar Universal Declaration of Human
Rights, were the Nuremburg and Tokyo trials of an elite group of leaders deemed by the victors
to be punishable for "crimes against humanity." These two precedents have led to other trials,
administered nationally and internationally, most notably in West Germany but not at all in
Japan.
A national legal system has both assets and liabilities for answering victim cries for the
truth about their unjust suffering. When the courts of one's own country put the officials of a
previous regime in the dock, the public knows that the government is at work recovering or
rectifying its own laws. But when the judges and the court systems themselves work still in the
shadow of habits and law emebedded in the repressive past, their decisions may yield little
"justice" in the eyes of victims. The most notrious recent example is 1996 judicial exoneration of
the head of the South African police force responsible for enforcing the repressions of the
aprtheid era. Qui custodient custodes? Not even in a relatively democratic society are courts of
law likely to prosecute all the collaborators responsible for gross "legal" injustices. Especially for
recovery from an era of stark violent official repression, courts are a necessary but insufficent
instrument, as Mark Osiel has recently demonstrated at length.

2. The restoration of freedom of speech and press. In modern society the supply of "truth" to
public consciousness will depend largely on whether both public and private communications are
safe from official violent controls. For example, on February 28, 1949, the armies of General
Chang Kai-shek, having fled mainland China for a new base in Taiwan, systematically murdered
some 20,000 civilian protesters against his regime. For the next forty years, it was illegal, under
the Kuomintang government, to mention this event in public or private conversation. In the late
1980s this law was lifted. Now in Taipei there is the beginning of a "2/28 Museum," whose
creators are seeking to bring together every fragment of evidence of what actually took place on
2/28/49.
The ability of modern repressive governments to control private as well as public
communication should not be underestimated. Jerrold Post of George Washington University
visited Argentina during the height of the "disappearances." Across a restaurant table he asked
his friend, "Tell me what you know about it." Immediately the customers in the room fell silent,
and Post's friend got up and left the restaurant. Now, in l997, under Argentina's "Defamation
Law", it is still impermissible to mention crimes against citizens by the police or other agents of
the former government. The law applies to journalists as well as to religious leaders. Some
3l,000 "disappeared" people have been officially consigned to public oblivion. A similar law in
Chile now subjects to arrest any members of the military police who report on their previous
activities in torturing and killing political dissidents.
These incidents suggest that, under the oppressions of a totalitarian government and even
under its allegedly democratic successors, a speech-act can be, by legal definition, a crime. As
George Orwell depicted them, twentieth century totalitarians have learned that speech-control is
a step towards thought-control. In China in the 1940s, Japanese occupiers made made official use
of the term "thought crime". In turn, Chinese communists invoked the same concept, forcing
many citizens to indulge in public "self-criticism", not for what they had done but for what they
had thought. Consistent totalitarianism intends to deprive citizens of the right to a "wrong"
consciousness.
Its success in doing so will be greatly aided by repression of interpersonal as well as public
speech, and such success has enormous impact on the mental health of its most damaged victims.
Study of victims of torture in Argentina and Chile reveals that they have great difficulty
recovering from their ordeals if, like Eric Dyson, they find no one willing to listen to their
stories. As Dr. Rona Fields says: "Social response to the victim seems to be the most important
fctor in the recovery. No acknowledgment of the event or of guilt from anybody else increases
the pain of the trauma and increases the tendency in private to rehash it, to relive it over and
over."
Pondered in this awful context, politically protected free speech is not grounded merely
in the rationalist tradition of human rights but as deeply in social requirements for the health and
well-being of individuals, including those whom official society has devastated. Various studies
of torture confirm that a principal aim of the process is not only to extract information but to
"reform" the mind of the victim. Dr. Dario Logos, a psychiatrist, summarizing his work with
torture victims in Argentina, concludes that "successful" torture induces the subject to "attribute
a value of truth to the discourse of the alienating force. Reality [now] is how the other person
defines it and the subject is in agreement to this definition that the other despotic person gives."

These illustrations blur distinctions between a right to private and a right to public
freedom of speech. To practice one is to begin the practice of the other; to suppress one is to
serve the repression of the other. Political power can promote or inhibit the practice and the
repression in both settings. Like other human rights, victims' right to tell their stories requires
social-political protection and encouragement.
3. Organized non-governmental investigations and hearings. Highly centralized political orders
may still allow for some freedom of citizens to organize for giving voice to their complaints
against government repression. Churches in East Germany are a recent example. In the late
'eighties they offered their building spaces for citizen gatherings seeking redress of grievances
against the communist government. From a totalitarian perspective, this was dangerous free
space. The public, non-violent demonstrations that emerged from these meetings led eventually
to the toppling of the regime. In Romania, the beginning of the overthrow of Ceaucescu was
sparked by a government attempt to throttle a pastor of the Reformed Church in Transylvania, an
action which, once resisted by local citizens, encouraged a revolt by the military. Even in the
years of maximum violent repression of apartheid's enemies in South Africa, its government's
grudging respect for religious freedom enabled some church groups to nourish protest and to
furnish the international press with stories that made the names Sharpeville, Crossroads, and
Robben Island widely known.
Another striking illustration from Africa is the Justice and Peace Commission set up by the
Roman Catholic bishops of Rhodesia in the 1970s as civil war raged in the countryside. Without
any formal power to control the violence, the bishops sent out the word that they were ready to
hear from persons anywhere in the country who wanted their experience of ill treatment by either
side of the war to get public exposure. The result was dramatic.
"'Africans grew to see [the Commission] as a major means at their disposal to
speak of their oppression.' Villagers trekked long distances to Salisbury to tell the
commission of their plight. 'Often there was no thought of redress, simply the
quest for someone who would listen, see the wounds, and understand what was
happening in the guerrilla war. It was strangely not so much a quest for justice
and peace as a quest for truth. And it was ultimately truth, rather than justice and
peace, that the Commission achieved and will be remembered for.'"
Organizations that challenge governmental versions of truth may have very limited political
impact. They have a tenuous place in the theory and practice of centralized states. They are often
more a refuge for the surviving victims of official violence than agents for abolishing official
systems. But, as these illustrations suggest, they sometimes start processes of change beyond
their expectations. That possibility alone is one reason why even their modest organizational
freedom is worrisome to autocrats.
4. Governmentally authorized "truth" commissions. New governments, coming in the wake of
repressive ones, have something to gain from publicly acknowledging the crimes of their
predecessors. They also have something to lose--a problem to be explored further below. The
chief gain is the renewal of citizen loyalty, including the loyalty of those who have suffered most
from the old regime. The latter's suspicion of all government is likely to run deep, so that any
opportunity for victims to tell their stories can occasion not only some healing of individuals but
a healing of the fractured civic bond as well. The other side of knitting up that bond, of course,

concerns the perpetrators. Some truth commissions have opened their processes to both sides of
previous political conflict, offering victims and perpetrators their day in court. Indeed, even if a
truth commission is not a court, it resembles the adversary process when it lets every side to tell
its story.
Several new governments, in the past fifteen years, have authorized research into official
records, testimonies of victims and perpetrators of gross injustices, and public reporting of
findings. The leading post-World War Two example is the Federal Republic of Germany, whose
leaders, beginning especially in the 1960s, set about to find and introduce into public life
accurate recollection of the Nazi era. History books, museums, ceremonial remembrance of
victims, and judicial prosecution of the most notorious agents of Nazi terror mark the Federal
Republic of Germany as a remarkable case of government-led collective facing of evil in a
national past.
More recently, truth commissions have made reports to new governments in Chile, Argentina, El
Salvador, and Guatemala. The fate of these reports, in these four countries, flags a great political
problematic: How much publicity of the crimes of a past government will serve the interest of a
present government? In particular, will the truth about the past serve to unify or further to disrupt
the society? Quite in contrast to the German example, truth commission reports in the above four
countries have issued in quick abandonment of follow-up implications. President Patricio
Aylwin, tendering the Chilean public via television a summary of the report delivered to him in
1990, offered an apology to the nation for the crimes of the predecessor government. Soon after,
with an irony endemic to "representative" democracies, the new Chilean parliament granted
amnesty to all persons and groups identified in the report, leaving the victims of the crimes with
very partial satisfaction of their cry for "justice." Whether amnesty and impunity for perpetrators
can with integrity be combined with public truth about their deeds remains one of the great
questions surrounding recent, current, and future practice of truth commissions.
5. "Truth for amnesty". Truth and Reconciliation: this title of the current South Africa
experiment advertises the hopes and the dangers at stake in affording victims their day of public
truth. Authorized by government, truth commissions are political acts; and as such they are
designed to serve political aims, especially the aim of uniting citizens in loyalty to a new
government and in peace with each other. The truth about past suffering at the hands of
government can serve reconciliation, or so the South African parliament believed when it
authorized the TRC in December l995.
This commission is, by far, the world's most extensive current example of consistent pursuit of
victims' right to public truth. It has supoena power, can hold public and private hearings, can
recommend reparation measures for victims, and--most in dispute--can recommend amnesty for
perpetrators who confess their crimes but claim political motivation. "Truth for amnesty,"
observes Timothy Garton Ash, "is at once the most original and the most troublesome feature of
the commission's work. Most people find it hard and some find it impossible to accept that
multiple murderers should walk free."
Nonetheless, compared to the history of the recent Latin American amnesties, the South
Afican TRC is morally and politically more ambitious by far. In the Latin American cases, brave
beginnings of public truth about past atrocities have been cut short by "blanket" amnesties to
perpetrators whose names and crimes disappear from public record like the names and suffering

of their victims--all for the alleged purpose of a national shift towards getting on with the public
future. Whether political justice and political peace are best served by the Latin American or the
South African strategy, may remain for now an open question. Debate about the gain and loss
from granting victims a right to publicity is likely to continue for many years to come. Among
the major questions of the debate will be the following.
The ongoing debate: Questions for Moralists, Politicians, Jurists, and citizens.
Like "truth" in moral theory, truth in political society is only one virtue among others
needed for the integrity of the whole. The illustrations recalled here compose a strong argument
for the wisdom of the American theologian H. Richard Niebuhr who wrote: "Where common
memory is lacking, where [people] do not share in the same past, there can be no real
community, and where community is to be formed common memory must be created....the
measure of our unity is the extent of our common memory." Significantly, this quotation was
appropriated recently by Charles Villa-Vicencio, research director of the South African TRC.
The same conclusion has been drawn by the Colgate University political scientist, Robert
Rothstein, in a lecture in Jerusalem in May 1996:
"Stable peace may...require a concerted effort to revise the historical canon, to
begin teaching a new version of history, and to marginalize and contain the
extremists who reject the effort."
It is not only extremists, however, who have questions about the effort. "Stable peace" is a
compound of many interests, laws, procedures and principles. Tensions exist between all these,
and from these tensions arise many a puzzling question. None is to be dismissed lightly. Here are
four such questions.
l. How much public justice results from public truth?
"Making public the truth is itself a form of justice," says Richard Goldstone, distinguished judge
of the new South African Constitutional Court. Is it enough justice? Ordinary criminal law
assumes that the truth of a crime requires some ensuing punishment. Witnesses to the work of
the TRC "see how powerful is the public shaming" of confessing perpetrators, but the formal
rules of the Commission imply that "contrition" is not an absolute necessity for a
recommendation of amnesty for a perpetrator. This is the nub of the protest from some South
African victims of apartheid: that truth alone is not enough for justice, that amnesty as a reward
for truth may only deepen victims' sense that their persecutors have gotten off easy. It may even
open the temptation of some to wreak revenge in any extra-judicial way open to them. The
curtailment of private revenge, of course, is one classic reason for the very existence of a legal
judicial system. There is no guarantee, then, that revelations about the unjust past will serve the
coming of a more profoundly shared sense of justice in society at large.
Defenders of the truth commission procedure (including this writer) will reply that, while
truth about the past is no guarantee of social peace, concealment of that truth is so rankling to
victims that it virtually guarantees a future disruption of the peace. "There is no peace for the
wicked," says one Hebrew prophet. Neither is there peace for the victims of the wicked so long
as the latter go "scot-free." Advocates of quick closing of windows on the past--as in Latin
America--are betting that brief gestures of remembering and quick forgetting will best serve

peace and justice. The alternate scenario is that by this strategy they are building up unresolved
"wrath to come."
2. If publicly displayed truth is sometimes a benefit to victims, is it also sometimes a harm?
The work of the TRC has offered evidence for both sides of this issue. Many victims
have expressed gratitude for the chance to tell their stories, to have their suffering and their
perpetrators become part of public record. It is ordinary among victims of torture and other
traumatic suffering, however, to fear a rehearsal of their past ordeals, to speak about the
unspeakable indignities which they endured. A refinement of this embarrassment is the shame-added to anger--felt by many morally sensitive humans in the presence of radical evil done by a
fellow human. When that fellow is a member of one's family or a neighbor from whom one
expected no such behavior, hesitancy about public telling of the dark story is understandable
indeed.
What truths qualify for publicity, which do not? Democratic theory distinguishes "state"
and "society", mandating some insulation of the public and the private realms. Liberal democrats
have to insist that no one has an unambiguous right to ask anyone else to tell "the truth, the
whole truth, and nothing but the truth" about their personal histories. In conformity with this
principle, the South African TRC has no power to compel victims to come forward, even though
it does have power to subpoena accused perpetrators. The voluntary nature of the truth-telling is
a reflection of the compassion built into the Commission legislation. Even when voiced with
great renewal of pain, however, victims' exercise of their right to truth serves society's need for
that truth. Whether victims have a right to keep silent, in spite of society's needs, remains a
difficult question.
3. Does the scale of some collectively-enacted crime exceed the capacity of institutions either to
determine "the whole truth" or to mete out justice to all the perpetrators?
The question has come up for debate again and again since the Nuremberg trials of 194546, which resulted in the execution of only twelve Nazi leaders and life imprisonment sentences
of only seven others. Subsequently the Federal Republic of Germany took up the cause,
prosecuting, by 1970, some 12,900 former Nazi officials, imprisoning 5,200 of these, 76 of them
for life. In the same 1970, however, half of the Republic's 15,000 active judges had held offices
in the Nazi regime. Furthermore, whether or not Professor Goldhagen counts of "Hitler's willing
executioners" are correct, we have always known that responsibility for the crimes of Nazism
spread far and wide in the German public. Few astute observers of political collectivities should
be surprised. "Responsibility spread thin" is by definition the rule, not the exception, of most
modern politically-engineered atrocity; and the search for justice to all perpetrators, in their
diverse degrees of responsibility, is illusory. Stalin's famous remark, "The murder of one person
is a tragedy, the murder of a million is a statistic," has a less cynical parallel in the pragmatic
view: "It is impossible to locate all the agents of the murder of a million; it is even more
impossible to bring all of them to court." To this, advocates of blanket amnesty add another
pragmatic argument: "It is bad for the future of the society to subject thousands of perpetrators to
public trial, even public truth." How could Germany have continued to run its judicial system,
after 1945, if it had dismissed or imprisoned 15,000 of its judges? How can the morale of an
army be preserved if every soldier, obedient to unjust orders, were to be prosecuted? All but a
tiny minority of resisters may have some part in the evils of a totalitarian system. Who is to draw

the line between those who deserve punishment and those who do not?
The answer to this question, likely to come from defenders of war-crime trials and truth
commissions: "Imperfect justice is better than no justice at all." The prosecution of notorious
leaders may come down to symbolic prosecution of the followers, but that symbolism is itself
important for the building of new structures of public culture, discourse, and law. What Osiel
says about the contribution of courts to this process applies also to the contribution of truth
commissions: neither can achieve all the shift to new democratic, collective mmemory, nor can
either bring to public judgement more than a fraction of the people who are probably responsible
for large-scale politically engineered massacre. But the work of both "may...authorize and thus
encourage the telling of other, more personal stories, both within courts and elsewhere in
society." They thus enable "thousands of victims to tell stories that, without such official
encouragement, would never publicly be told."
"Truth for amnesty", in short, may leave victims' sense of justice unsatisfied, but truth is
some balm for their hurt memories, and even partial truth is a door-opener to yet other truth. "He
could pretend he never did it. Now he cannot. Nor can a lot of other collaboarators we can now
talk about...."
As the charter of the South African TRC makes clear, public reparation, typically in financial
terms, has to be consdiered as an addition to the largely symbolic justice of public truth. Once it
has provided a forum for story-telling about long-concealed atrocity and offer some tangible
compensation for loss, the society may have done what it can do to remedy the irremediable. Part
of the story that many a victim wants to tell is the tragedy of losses that can never be
compensated.
Careful study of many national experiences with this question will be required before the
politicians and lawmakers will be entitled to settled conclusions in the matter. Truth-from-many
may have to combine with prosecution-for-some. The two are in something of a zero-sum game:
Without the promise of amnesty, some perpetrators have little self-interest in coming forward
with their confessions, insuring the permanent inaccessibility of the facts. Which is better: That
the crimes of many should at least be acknowledged? Or that the crimes of fewer should be
judicially punished? In regard to social recovery from massive atrocity, the question is likely to
be debated nationally and internationally for many a year to come.
4. Are the internal crimes of national political leaders subject to international law?
Many political leaders around the world today claim that every nation has a right to
conceal its past from its own citizens and from the rest of the world as well. This claim abuts on
the wider question of who, besides victims of atrocity, has a "right to truth." Do diplomats and
historians from one nation have a right to investigate the affairs of another nation without being
arrested as spies? Internal and external degrees of openness to the uncovering of truths that
discomfort someone are intimately, practically related here. On a planet whose human
inhabitants are likely to become ever more densely interconnected in the decades just ahead,
some internal national truths will have import far beyond local political boundaries.
The implication here is that, for the commission of some great atrocities, the world of nations has
the right to hold leaders of its members accountable. Not just abstract "knowledge" but concrete,

moral and legal obligation of "acknowledgment" is the requirement here, and here again the
work of the South African TRC deserves worldwide attention. One astute observer of the current
work of the TRC has suggested that it might more accurately be renamed a "Commission for
Knowledge and Acknowledgement." Knowledge of truth is a primary academic value, but as a
political value "acknowledgement" involves victims' special rights to knowledge: the right to
inform the state, and a wider public, of their version of events. But the other political side of
acknowledgment concerns perpetrators, who are morally less entitled to keep their secrets than
are their victims. By virtue of their offices in repressive systems, some perpetrators are more
obligated than others to acknowledge that they they were the authorizers of the crimes of their
followers.
"Fifty historians could write accurate, closely documented accounts of the
repression, the atrocities, the third force, and still ordinary white South Africans
could deny it. But when their former president is reported in every newspaper and
seen on national television saying he apologizes and repents...then it becomes
much more difficult to deny."
It is more difficult to deny because some persons in every society are representatives, if not of
the whole, then of significant parts of the whole. Holding leaders responsible for the acts of their
followers seems minimally necessary for implementing any process for salvaging some remnent
of justice from the devastations of the past. Since Nuremberg, there has been impressive
international consensus on the principle: if the leaders are not brought to dock, it is unjust to
prosecute their followers. (This is currently a major problem for public acceptance in South
Africa of the results of the TRC, since no major official of the ruling Nationalist government has
come forward to testify and ask for amnesty.)
The accountability of the leaders of any nation to their own people is a plausible
democratic idea, but should the idea be expanded to the world of nations in general? At stake
here is the connection between the Nuremberg concept of "crimes against humanity" and the
right of international bodies to demand truth and punishment of national leaders who perpetrate
those crimes.
As of the summer of 1997, the problem of effecting such a demand internationally came
to focus in the case of Radovan Karadzic, leader of the Bosnian Serbs, still at large in Bosnia
while under indictment for war crimes in the International Court of Justice in the Hague. With
his Serbian compatriots, of course, Karadzic does not recognize the right of an international
tribunal to try him for atrocities committed in alleged pursuit of political objectives. Here the
recent history of South Africa is in decided, hopeful contrast. For decades international pressures
mounted against the racist policies of its Nationalist government. The collapse of apartheid came
in part from the repeated outside voicing of the truth about its victims. The views of outsiders
made a difference to the leaders and the led in South Africa; almost all visitors to the country
could detect that. It is not surprising, then, that the new leaders of the country should be quite
sensitive to the positive importance of international consensus and law for the past and future
history of their nation. The current highest judicial official of South Africa, Minister of Justice
Omar Dullah, for example, refers and defers repeatedly to the place of internationally recognized
standards for judging the work of the TRC, whose parliamentary authorization he helped to
design.

"I don't think the TRC can fly in the face of the international law and international
values which have been created."
[Asked what advice he would give, in turn, to other countries struggling with their
own issues of "truth and reconciliation," he replied:]
"The provisions for amnesty [in our TNC] are far too generous in terms of
international law. If I were to live through the experience again, I would pay far
greater attention to the need to prosecute in appropriate cases so as to ensure that
we are able to more effectively establish the rule of law. My advice to other
countries would be not to be as generous as we have been."
The assumption in these words from the chief legal officer of South Africa is that its internal
search for justice has obligatory external norms to take into account. To date such opinions from
such an officer are rare among national leaders. In Argentina's trial of junta officers, the new
government overtly avoided invoking international standards of law. Justice Dullah illustrates yet
another reason why eyes around the world have focused intently upon the past and present
political debate in his country: what has happened and will happen there has impact and meaning
for assorted societies around the globe. Its models of search for "truth and reconciliation" may
involve premises and procedures that other nations ought not to adopt. But the complex of moral,
legal, and political issues made explicit in the work of its TRC offers the world an astonishing
example of one nation's collective will to make the awful truth of its past serve the coming of
more benign truth in its future.

Conclusion: Building Social Tolerance for Truth that Discomforts
The right of every citizen to seek public "redress of grievances" is so basic to the American legal
order that it would be easy to conclude that the profusion of amnesties, truth commission reports,
and associated legal debates in other countries are largely irrelevant to Americans. To maintain
this superficial view may require some forgetting by Americans of their own country's fall into
atrocious collective behavior as relatively recent as slavery, the massacre of Native Americans,
and the incarceration of Japanese Americans.
At the end of its report on that latter case, an American version of a truth commission in 1982
called attention to a decision of the Supreme Court, immediately after the Civil War, refusing the
request of the Federal Army to invoke martial law in the states that bordered the Confederacy.
Those states have always been legal parts of the country, said the Court; and it issued this
cautionary observation about democracy-under-threat:
"When peace prevails, and the authority of government is undisputed, there is no
difficulty in preserving the safeguards of liberty;...but if society is disturbed by
civil commotion--if the passions of men are aroused and the restraints of law are
weakened, if not disregarded--these safeguards need, and should receive, the
watchful care of those entrusted with the guardianship of the Constitution and
laws. In no other way can we transmit to posterity unimpaired the blessing of
liberty."

Our century is full of warnings of the capacity of one segment of organized society to impose
death and other suffering on a massive scale upon others; but it is not easy for most humans, in
times of comfort and complacency, to keep such warnings in mind. It is not easy because some
truths about the human past and some potentials for our human future are painful to consider. If
the current rash of truth commissions tells us nothing else about human nature, they tell us that
tolerance for painful truths is always at risk even in the most democratic of societies.
The practical implication for the protection of a wide range of democratic freedoms, in
every society, is that if its members are open to the pain of acknowledging its past injustices,
they are already on the way to the practice of a form of "tolerance" more robust than the casual
unconcern often implied by that word.
One American Supreme Court judge defined democratic tolerance as "freedom for the
thought we hate." In science, art, religion, economics, and politics, one is likely to meet many
provocations to such hate. The freedom of my neighbor to speak a thought hateful to me but
precious to her is an awesome freedom, often producing clashes of mind, feeling, and rhetorical
exchange that tempt one or both parties to consider a turn to violence. Nothing in human affairs
is a more likely occasion for that turn than the emphatic claim: "I am right, you are wrong."
The work of the most authentic of truth commissions makes eactly the opposite claim: "I
was, we were wrong. You were right." Until some drastic changes occur in human nature
worldwide, ease in that kind of confession will be rare, difficult, and in need of all the
protections a conflict-prone society can muster. As one witness to the current work of South
Africa's TRC has written:

"Acknowledging responsibility, making apology and contributing to reparations
are...powerful ways of strangthening a new moral order. Confirming one's
membership of a new reconciled society through acceptance of responsiblity for
one's actions...would appear to be a recipe for a deeper sense of reconciliation.
"This is not a short term solution...A restorative process will have to be pursued
for some years if not into the next generation. It is a process that also needs to be
pursued at both the personal and institutional levels."
The "new moral order" underway in South Africa, one dares to hope, will catalyze a truly civil
society whose members will have acquired some habit of listening to the views--including the
complaints--of each other, and thus practicing a form of tolerance more akin to care than to
indifference. The ability to care about, and to live in some peace with, one's neighbors is a hope
for society at once moral, political, and legal. Learning to listen to the pains of a neighbor is
good practice for learning to respect his or her humanity in many dimensions--intellectual,
moral, religious, legal, political. It is also the necessary practical corollary to the right of free
speech: the right to be heard.

